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Abstract
This paper presents a set of statistical analyses on
an empirical study of phishing email sorting by real
online users. Participants were assigned to multitasking
and/or incentive conditions in unattended web-based
tasks that are the most realistic in any comparable study
to date. Our three stages of analyses included logistic
regression models to identify individual phishing
“cues” contributing to successful classifications,
statistical significance tests assessing the links between
participants’ training experience and self-assessments
of success to their actual performance, significance tests
searching for significant demographic factors
influencing task completion performance, and lastly kmeans clustering based on a range of performance
measures and utilizing participants’ demographic
attributes. In particular, the results indicate that
multitasking and incentives create complex dynamics
while demographic traits and cybersecurity training can
be informative predictors of user security behavior.
These findings strongly support the benefits of security
training and education and advocate for customized and
differentiated interventions to increase users’ success of
correctly identifying phishing emails.

1. Introduction
Most studies to understand users’ security behavior
have been conducted in controlled lab environments
where participants might vary their behaviors at the
presence of distracting or even intrusive factors. Apart
from measuring broad performance indicators of task
success based on predetermined criteria (e.g., “right” or
“not very secure”), many of these studies relied on selfreported feedback from participants. Partly due to such
constraints, it is hard to comprehensively examine the
relationships between users’ operations, performance,
and demographic characteristics.
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The empirical study presented in this paper tasked
participants with sorting 40 emails as legitimate or
phishing within a set time duration. It also introduced a
multitasking requirement and a monetary incentive.
Participants were recruited through the Amazon
Mechanical Turk human subject pool to conduct webbased tasks remotely. Data capture techniques
administered through the webmail platform Roundcube
(https://roundcube.net) and the survey platform
Qualtrics (https://www.qualtrics.com) collect fine
details of user operations, e.g., mouse movements and
clicks, continuously.
This work aims to make two contributions. First,
the empirical study used real emails in a realistic task
environment on computer users in an unattended fashion
to capture security behaviors of high fidelity. The
analyses lend insight into patterns of participants’
performance on phishing detection tasks. It also showed
that a user’s demographic background, e.g., education,
training, and age, bear correlation with performance
indicators of security risk and operating time in such
email sorting tasks. Second, our methodology combines
a range of statistical tests with clustering analysis to
explore a broad degree of useful knowledge. The
analyses range from traditional significance tests, to
regression modeling using phishing cues, and to kmeans clustering that simultaneously considers multiple
performance measures. These methods are able to
identify unique subpopulations among participants that
exhibited differing behaviors. The results further
revealed the complexity of different users interacting
with email elements and how a range of internal and
external factors impact their security decisions.

2. Background
2.1. Cybersecurity user studies
Several studies have examined how users respond
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to phishing emails such as the impact of using mobile
devices. In one prominent effort, Vishwanath et al.
developed the Suspicion, Cognition, and Automaticity
Model (SCAM) to describe the cognitive, preconscious,
and automatic processes contributing to phishing
success [8]. The model specifically highlights
interrelations between factors such as individuals’
preexisting cyber-risk beliefs, suspicion, and multiple
information processing modes. Two empirical tests
supported SCAM predictions, finding, for instance, that
greater awareness of online cyber risks led university
students to process suspected emails more thoroughly,
while students with less concern for such risks tended to
judge emails according to simple decision rules.
In a study of similar phishing email sorting tasks
[4], the authors illustrated the effectiveness of using the
double system lens model, a judgment analysis
technique with linear regression, to understand both
how users synthesized phishing cues to make a
judgment and how effective those cues were in the
environment in which the judgments were made. For
each participant model, the cue weights represented how
the user used each cue. For the environment model, the
cue weights represented how diagnostic that cue was for
identifying a phishing email. Although not
generalizable beyond the emails analyzed in the
research, this effort identified lack of signer details, lack
of branding/logos, and the presence of suspicious links
as the most relevant cues in classifying an email.
Extensive research in computer security, and more
generally in psychology, has utilized unattended webbased questionnaires, camera recording, and other
participant self-reported data. For example, Bianchi et
al. [2] used Amazon Mechanical Turk to study Android
users’ ability to resist GUI confusion attacks, which
utilize social engineering principles similar to those in
phishing attempts. They developed an emulated
Android GUI remotely accessible via a web browser.
In [9], the authors performed a series of
significance tests on the data of the present empirical
study, finding that multitasking worsened participants’
sorting accuracy and that, in general, differences
between the conditions affected participants’ ability to
sort phishing emails, but not legitimate emails. Incentive
alone, by contrast, made no difference in either
multitasking or no-multitasking cases. Multitasking and
incentive showed opposite effects on email processing
time: multitasking reduced users’ email processing
time, while the incentive increased this value. However,
spending more time on individual emails did not
guarantee better sorting accuracy.

2.2. Analysis of user demographics
A study by Sheng et al. [5] is one of the most

relevant studies on phishing susceptibility with a focus
on demographic analysis. Through a large-scale
roleplay survey using simulated emails, the authors
found that gender and age can predict risks of falling for
phishing attempts, and that educational material helped
to reduce it. The results were consistent with several
other studies including that by Kumaraguru et al. [3].
A number of previous studies explored the role of
demographic factors of users in other cybersecurity
applications. For example, Akhawe and Felt [1] studied
web users’ tendencies to dismiss or respond to browser
security warnings. They found behavioral differences
between early adopters of new browser updates and
users who waited for default browser releases,
attributing some of these distinctions to varying levels
of technical ability among individuals. By contrast,
Sunshine et al. studied user responses to Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) warnings and found little effect from
technical expertise [7]. In a second experiment
comparing the effects of various real and designed SSL
notifications, the researchers additionally found no
significant differences from gender.

3. Methodology
3.1. A user study of email sorting
The research team progressed through our
university’s IRB review and approval process. 177
participants from the United States progressed through
this study in late 2017. The analysis focused on the 146
participants who sorted all 40 emails in the given time.
Experimental Design - Participants functioned as
a personal assistant directed to classify emails into either
a “keep” or “suspicious” folder. As shown in Table 1,
participants were randomly assigned to one of four
experimental conditions. Multitasking participants
answered 20 sets of questions through Qualtrics while
sorting the emails, as shown in Figure 1. Each question
set was presented for a maximum of two minutes;
participants could manually advance to the next set after
one minute elapsed. Thus, multitasking participants had
40 minutes at most to complete both tasks. For the nomultitasking condition, participants were given 30
minutes to complete only the email sorting task. The
right side of the screen showed a countdown timer
instead of the multitasking questions.
Table 1. Experimental condition and the
number of participants (in parentheses)
Incentivized

Non-incentivized

Multitasking

1 (35)

3 (34)

No-multitasking

2 (42)

4 (35)
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Figure 1. Multitasking condition where a participant classifies emails and answers questions
concurrently
Incentivized participants could earn additional
monetary compensation based on the number of
correctly sorted emails. For those participants in the
multitasking with incentive condition, earning extra
money also depended on the number of multitasking
questions answered accurately. Participants were
eligible for the incentive if they correctly sorted 30/40
emails and correctly answered 15/20 multitasking
questions. More information is available at
http://behavior.isi.jhu.edu/.
Email Design and Phishing Cues - All 40 emails
were created from real emails with personally
identifiable information modified. Twenty (20) phishing
emails were derived from a semi-random sample of
emails in Cornell University’s “Phish Bowl” database
(https://it.cornell.edu/phish-bowl). The other 20
legitimate emails were derived from emails received by
the research team.
We analyzed a series of 12 information or phishing
cues, contained within the emails, implying whether
those emails are legitimate or phishing. Crucially,
legitimate emails may contain suspicious cues, such as
misspellings or an absent greeting, while phishing
emails may contain non-suspicious cues to seem
legitimate. However, phishing emails on average
contained more suspicious cues than legitimate emails,
providing a path to accurate classification. All cues and
definitions are available at http://behavior.isi.jhu.edu/
with some examples given below.
• URL Hyperlinking: are displayed hyperlinks
mismatched with the underlying links?
• Spelling and Grammar Errors: does the text
contain spelling or grammar mistakes?
• Use of Threatening Language: does the email
threaten a negative consequence if instructions
unfollowed?

3.2. Data collection
Log Files and Information Extraction - Each log
file represented a single user, and every line in the file
was an event. Each event record included timestamps,
the user identification, the operation taken, and
additional information relevant to the operation. These
operations consisted of common user interactions with
a webpage, including mouse clicking, hovering,
scrolling, and moving over objects on the Roundcube
and Qualtrics user interfaces, such as menus, buttons,
links, email attachments, questions, and answer choices.
Moreover, specific events were triggered when a user’s
mouse moved between the Roundcube and Qualtrics
windows.
The log file data also enabled determination of
metrics such as total email processing time. For the nomultitasking conditions, this value was defined as the
time interval between a user opening (clicking on) an
email and classifying (moving) that email. For the
multitasking conditions, processing time excluded any
period when the mouse cursor was in the Qualtrics
window.
Demographics and Self-Reported Information We collected self-reported demographics and other
information on participants’ experiences to aid in
interpreting the experimental results. Items considered
in our analysis included age, education level, and
experience
with
network
or
cybersecurity
courses/certificates. We also utilized participants’ selfrated confidence in each email classification decision (1:
not confident at all, to 10: extremely confident) and their
own estimates of email sorting accuracy.
Behavioral Performance Measures - Six
performance measures were directly extracted from log
files for each participant (Table 2). The first pair is the
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Table 2. Six user performance measures
Performance Measure
Processing time (phishing)
Processing time (legitimate)
Average rating (phishing)
Average rating (legitimate)
False negative rate (FNR)
False positive rate (FPR)

Definition
Measured in seconds, range of
value is approximately (0,1050)
Measured in seconds, range of
value is approximately (0, 900)
Range [0,10]
Range [0,10]
Range [0,1]
Range [0,1]

processing times for phishing and legitimate emails
respectively, measured as the total time spent on all the
emails in each category. The second pair is the average
confidence ratings for phishing and legitimate emails
respectively. The third pair is false negative rate (FNR)
and false positive rate (FPR), which are the error rates
for phishing and legitimate email classifications
respectively.

3.3. Data analysis methodology
This work aimed to further understand our detailed
empirical study results, focusing on identifying
emerging subpopulations that are different in their
security behaviors. As shown in Figure 2, we employed
a three-stage approach toward this goal.
Cue and User Confidence Analyses - The firststage analyses looked further into participants’
performance in different condition groups. Principal
component analysis (PCA) was performed to identify
correlations between different email cues, ultimately
reducing the full cue set to a smaller number of noncorrelated cues. Next, for each participant, a logistic
classifier was trained using that participant’s email
classification results in order to weight the significance
of each cue for a given user’s decisions. One-way
ANOVAs, Tukey’s test, and Welch’s t-test were
performed to identify whether experimental condition
influenced the use of each cue. Finally, correlation tests
were conducted between individuals’ self-estimated and
actual sorting accuracy.
Demographic Partitioning Analyses - We then
concentrated on analyses that partitioned the

Cue and User Confidence
Analyses
• PCA
• Logistic classifier
• ANOVAs on experimental
condition effects
• Correlation tests between
self-estimated and true
classification accuracy

participants according to their demographic factors of
age, education, and cybersecurity training. ANOVAs
were performed within each condition group to assess
demographic differences in participants in terms of how
they valued the various cues in an email. Additional
statistical analysis was performed to determine the
impact of past training on sorting accuracy. Correlations
between estimated and actual performance were again
examined, this time distinguishing between trained and
untrained participants.
Clustering Analysis - Some of the above analyses
identified statistically significant differences on
individual performance measures. However, we had
difficulty clearly categorizing and understanding the
entire participant population through these tests. This
may suggest that the subpopulations did not prominently
vary along any single performance measure. After
trying several clustering methods, we utilized k-means
clustering to simultaneously consider all six
performance measures.

4. Analysis and findings
4.1. Phishing cue and decision confidence
analyses
We first performed PCA by evaluating correlations
between the appearance of unique cues among the 40
emails. Significant correlations (Pearson correlation
coefficient p < 0.05) were present between multiple sets
of cues, and so we narrowed our scope to a subset of
eight non-correlated cues from the original twelve:
Suspicious Sender Display Name, URL Hyperlinking,
Poor Overall Design, Generic Greeting, Use of Time
Pressure, Use of Emotional Appeals, Too Good to be
True Offers, and Request for Personal Information.
Further analysis used only these non-correlated cues.
Next, we trained a logistic model using the email
classification results for each participant. For an email
classified as “phishing,” y is ‘1’; for emails classified as
“legitimate,” y is ‘0.’ Each of these emails has its own
set of indicators, X, corresponding to whether each of
the eight cues selected above is present. Thus, the

Demographic Partitioning
Analyses
• Welch’s t-tests
• Correlation tests
• ANOVAs on demographic
factors

Clustering Analysis
• K-means clustering;
k = 2-8

Figure 2. An analysis approach combining three stages
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Table 3. Average phishing cue weights of logistic models for experimental conditions
Experimental
Condition
1. Incentivized
Multitasking
2. Incentivized Nomultitasking
3. Non-incentivized
Multitasking
4. Non-incentivized
No-multitasking

Suspicious
Sender

URL
Hyperlinking

Generic
Greeting

Time
Pressure

Emotional
Appeal

-0.32

Poor
Overall
Design
1.02

0.49

-0.04

0.36

0.53

-0.18

1.00

-0.16

0.51

-0.25

1.01

0.59

-0.09

0.90

Table 4. Confidence ratings for experimental
conditions
Condition
1. Incentivized
Multitasking
2. Incentivized Nomultitasking
3. Non-incentivized
Multitasking
4. Non-incentivized
No-multitasking

Rating
M=7.682,
SD=0.430
M=7.757,
SD=0.652
M=7.493,
SD=0.544
M=7.783,
SD=0.596

T-test (Between
Two Conditions)

3,4: t=-2.269,
p=0.026
3,4: t=-2.269,
p=0.026

independent variables per user constituted a 40 x 8
binary matrix, and our dependent variables composed a
40 x 1 binary matrix. Our analysis assumed that every
user processed each cue in an email.
In this logistic model, the weights indicate each
cue’s importance to the participant’s classification of an
email. These weights were then averaged over each
condition group as shown in Table 3. For example, Poor
Email Design was highly characteristic of a phishing
email in all four groups, while Too Good to be True
Offers and Generic Greetings were less indicative.
Eight separate one-way ANOVAs were performed,
one for each non-correlated cue, to compare the effect
of experiment condition on the use of the cue.
Significant differences at the p < 0.05 level occurred for
only two cues: URL Hyperlinking (p = 0.029) and Too
Good to be True Offers (p = 0.031). However,
performing Tukey’s test for these two cues failed to
demonstrate any significant difference in weights
between these condition groups.
Next, multiple t-tests revealed a difference in
confidence ratings between conditions 3 and 4 (Table
4). When the incentive was absent, the single-task
participants reported slightly higher confidence ratings
than those assigned the secondary task. However,
applying Bonferroni corrections for multiple
comparisons revealed no significant difference in
performance between experimental groups, indicating
that the former group’s sorting accuracy did not improve
despite spending more time per email and their higher
confidence ratings. This may show a challenge that

-0.53

Too
Good to
be True
0.15

Request for
Personal
Information
0.30

0.45

-0.39

0.12

0.28

-0.11

0.39

-0.35

0.18

0.34

-0.13

0.39

-0.42

0.32

0.25

Table 5. Correlation between self-estimated and
actual numbers of correctly sorted emails
Condition
1. Incentivized Multitasking
2. Incentivized No-multitasking
3. Non-incentivized Multitasking
4. Non-incentivized No-multitasking

Correlation
Coefficient
0.253
0.272
0.467
0.336

T-test
p=0.142
p=0.082
p=0.005
p=0.048

participants faced in asserting their decisions, even
when they focused only on email sorting.
Lastly, we calculated correlation coefficients
between participants’ self-estimated and actual numbers
of correctly sorted emails (Table 5). Significant
correlations were identified for conditions 3 and 4. We
found no significant correlation for the incentive
participants (conditions 1 and 2); counterintuitively, this
result may represent the incentive having pressured
participants into overthinking their email sorting
actions.

4.2. Demographic analyses based on
partitioning participants
Previous analyses had alerted us to the
complicating effect imposed by multitasking on
participants’ behaviors. We first focused demographic
comparisons of the no-multitasking participant groups
(2 and 4). For age-based tests, participants were split
into two groups (age ranges 20-38 and 39-56 for
condition 2; 22-41 and 42-61 for condition 4) and then
three groups (age ranges 20-33, 34-47, 48-61 for
condition 2; 22-34, 35-48, 49-61 for condition 4), with
divisions based on keeping group sizes equal. Welch’s
t-tests were taken comparing all of these condition
groups. Similar partitions were taken for participants’
highest education achieved (one of seven values ranging
from no high school to doctorate) as well. However,
none of these tests found significant results.
Similarly, we performed ANOVAs to analyze the
role that demographic factors played on participants’
perception of different email cues, including:
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Table 6. Demographic analysis on phishing cue weights of logistic models
Experimental
Condition
1. Incentivized
Multitasking

Demographic

Email Cue

Population 1

Student Status
Age

Generic Greeting
Poor Overall
Design

2. Incentivized Nomultitasking

Highest
Education

Generic Greeting

Student
Ages 30-39
Ages 50-59
Some College

3. Non-incentivized
Multitasking

4. Non-incentivized
No-multitasking

Student Status

Highest
Education
Student Status

Generic Greeting
Request for
Personal
Information
URL
Hyperlinking
Use of Emotional
Appeal

Table 7. Impact of cybersecurity training
experience on sorting accuracy
Group

Accuracy

1. Trained
Multitasking
2. Trained Nomultitasking

M=0.704,
SD=0.121
M=0.864,
SD=0.048

3. Untrained
Multitasking
4. Untrained Nomultitasking

M=0.779,
SD=0.093
M=0.741,
SD=0.113

•
•

T-test (Between Two
Groups)
1,2: t=-3.027, p=0.022
1,2: t=-3.027, p=0.022
2,3: t=4.093, p=0.002
2,4: t=5.360, p=0.0000734
2,3: t=4.093, p=0.002
3,4: t=2.025, p=0.045
2,4: t=5.360, p=0.0000734
3,4: t=2.025, p=0.045

Student Status (Yes/No)
Highest Education Achieved (1: No High
School Diploma, 2: High School, 3: Some
College, 4: Two-Year Associate, 5: Four-Year
Bachelor, 6: Master’s Degree, 7: Doctorate
Degree)
• Cybersecurity Training Experience (Yes/No)
• Age (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, ...)
Performing Tukey’s test on the results found some
differences among participant subpopulations, as in
Table 6. For example, being a student or not was a
significant differentiator in several cases including the
usage of Generic Greeting in decision making. In
another example, Poor Overall Design affected several
age groups differently.
Furthermore, 13 participants previously completed
a
network
engineering
or
cybersecurity
course/certificate. For t-tests exploring this factor, we
divided the participants into four groups based on the
presence or absence of past cybersecurity training and
whether those participants had faced a multitasking
requirement. We chose to not divide these groups by the
incentive condition, as it did not seem to affect
performance.

Population 1
Cue Weight
0.323
1.276
1.189
-0.318

Bachelor’s
Degree
Student
Student

-0.021

High School

0.569

Student

0.064

0.661
-0.477

Population 2
Non-Student
Ages 60-70
Ages 60-70
Bachelor’s
Degree Holders
Master’s
Degree Holders
Non-Student
Non-Student
Two-Year
Associate
Non-Student

Population 2
Cue Weight
0.101
0.377
0.377
-0.021
-0.502
0.133
0.367
0.094
0.458

Table 8. Correlation between self-estimated
and actual numbers of correctly sorted emails
based on cybersecurity training experience
Group
Trained
Untrained

Correlation Coefficient
0.552
0.322

T-test
p=0.050
p=0.0001

Table 7 shows the trained no-multitasking group
achieved the highest email sorting accuracy.
Cybersecurity training did improve the classification
accuracy quite significantly when email sorting was the
only task. However, the trained multitasking group did
not perform better than the untrained multitasking. This
shows again the challenge presented by multitasking,
which complicated the effectiveness of training. Using
a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons
yielded significant differences between group 2-group 3
and group 2-group 4.
Lastly, we expanded statistical tests on the
correlation coefficients between participants’ selfestimated and true numbers of correctly sorted emails
by looking at their cybersecurity training experience. As
shown in Table 8, the 13 participants with cybersecurity
knowledge achieved a higher correlation coefficient,
seeming to suggest that they possessed better selfawareness of their performance than did other subjects.
This conclusion would be further supported with a
larger sample of such participants.
The complexity of the above statistical tests to find
subpopulations among participants and the required
computational cost are obvious. Any single
performance measure may not be discriminating enough
to efficiently find heterogenous participant subsets. The
small sample sizes resulting from demographic
partitioning present an additional challenge. These
observations strongly influenced our decision to pursue
clustering analysis, described below.
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4.3. Clustering analysis
As the monetary incentive showed no significant
effect on participants’ performance, participants were
sorted based on the multitasking condition and placed
into either the multitasking or no-multitasking group.
We applied the k-means algorithm using the six
performance measures on these two groups respectively
(Table 2). Furthermore, we used two different methods
to normalize values of the six performance measures;
i.e., the standard L2-norm function, also known as the
Euclidean norm, as well as the MinMaxScaler function
that normalizes the minimum and maximum bounds to

0 and 1. These two methods generated compatible
results.
We experimented with different k values, from two
to eight, and the most informative findings emerged for
a division of three distinct subpopulations:
• An “overachiever” cluster with strong overall
performance, shown by blue circles in plots;
• A “conservative” cluster featuring lower FNR
and higher FPR, shown by green triangles;
• A “naive” cluster featuring lower FPR and
higher FNR, shown by red squares.
These three clusters not only had clear partitions
with regards to FNR, FPR, and other behavior measures,

Figure 3. Clustering of participants in the no-multitasking condition using L2-norm normalization

Page 7169

Figure 4. Clustering of participants in the multitasking condition using L2-norm normalization
but also possessed interesting patterns in the
demographics of their member participants.
The clustering results are shown below as a set of
two-dimensional scatter plots (Figures 3-4). Each figure
has four subplots, of which (a)-(c) are the performance
measures used in clustering. In each (a) subplot,
displaying FNR and FPR, a numeric label denotes the
number of overlapping points, i.e., participants with the
same FNR and FPR values. Each (b) subplot shows the
two processing times of phishing emails vs. legitimate
emails, also featuring linear regression lines fit on each
cluster. Each (c) subplot, on participants’ average
decision confidence ratings for phishing emails vs.

legitimate emails, displays the three cluster centroids by
cross markers (+). Finally, the (d) subplots show three
pieces of important demographic information associated
with the clusters, namely age, education level, and
cybersecurity training, revealing a few patterns of note.
Figure 3 depicts the clustering results for the nomultitasking participants using the L2-norm
normalization method. As shown in Figure 3(a), naivecluster participants demonstrated comparatively high
FNR, signifying that they were less successful in
detecting phishing emails. Not coincidentally, as shown
in Figure 3(b), these participants also spent more time
classifying phishing emails than legitimate ones.
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Similarly, conservative-cluster participants exhibited
relatively high FPR: they experienced more difficulty
classifying legitimate emails despite spending more
time on these emails (and the monetary incentive may
have led some to overthink and misclassify legitimate
emails as phishing).
The overachiever cluster includes those
participants with both low FNR and FPR. These
participants also had the highest confidence level among
the three clusters. The corresponding linear regression
line in Figure 3(b) indicates that these participants
showed an overall slight tendency to spend less time on
phishing emails. One potential explanation is that they
had to examine a legitimate email thoroughly, e.g.,
checking more phishing cues, before confidently
moving it to the “keep” folder. However, they only
needed to find enough evidence of suspicion to correctly
classify a phishing email. This seems to support a
similar strategy used in the simulation study of nomultitasking users as reported in [6].
Intuitively, higher confidence ratings would be
associated with better performance. As shown in Figure
3(c), confidence ratings of different clusters in general
reflected their relative success at detecting phishing,
legitimate, or both types of emails. However, points
from different clusters are interspersed: some
conservative-cluster participants were less confident on
legitimate emails, and some naive-cluster participants
expressed higher confidence on phishing emails.
(Similarly, Figure 3(b) also features overlap between
clusters on email processing time.) These observations,
consistent with findings in our previous reports,
highlight the difficulty of relying on one or two criteria
to characterize security behaviors, and the necessity of
a comprehensive approach such as clustering.
Figure 3(d) highlights several interesting
demographic trends on the roles of cybersecurity
training experience, advanced education, and age on
phishing classification. All participants with
cybersecurity training, across all education levels, lie in
the overachiever cluster, as do all but one individual
possessing master’s or doctoral degrees. This seems to
suggest that academic study or training can effectively
improve a person’s security behavior. Additionally,
only one of the participants older than 45 is in the
overachiever cluster. This may suggest a negative effect
of aging on phishing classification, representing a
widespread challenge to confront in societies with aging
populations. We note that none of the above-45
participants possessed a graduate degree or had
cybersecurity training, complicating our ability to
determine whether age, lack of education/training, or a
combination influenced their comparatively poorer
performance. Further effort is highly desirable to study
this phenomenon.

The MinMaxScaler normalization method resulted
in clusters similar to, but seemingly less distinct than,
the L2-norm function. The average confidence ratings
apparently played a more significant role in forming
these clusters. While participants reporting the highest
confidence ratings mostly fell in the overachiever
cluster, the three clusters are mixed with regards to FNR
and FPR. Demographically, these clusters exhibit
almost identical patterns to those in Figure 3(d).
Figure 4 shows the clustering results for the
multitasking participants. Performance of the
multitasking participants was generally poorer than
single-tasking participants, as previously reported.
Consequently, the data points are further away from the
best performance, i.e., (0,0) in Figure 4(a) and (10,10)
in Figure 4(c). As shown in Figure 4(b), these
multitasking participants used less time overall to
process emails.
The results indicate that multitasking significantly
impacted the patterns among the three clusters. This is
shown by the increased cluster scattering in Figures 4(a)
and 4(c) as compared to corresponding subplots in
Figure 3. Still, some broader trends remain present:
naive-cluster participants spent more time processing
phishing emails, while conservative-cluster participants
spent more time on legitimate emails. Interestingly, the
corresponding linear regression line in Figure 4(b)
indicates that multitasking participants in the
overachiever cluster now spent relatively less time on
legitimate emails than phishing emails. Such behavior
contrasts with that of the no-multitasking participants in
this cluster, as seen in Figure 3(b), and might signal a
shift in the strategy described previously.
Lastly, Figure 4(d) does not exhibit the
demographic patterns as seen for no-multitasking
participants. Multitasking participants with previous
security training exhibited no increase in performance,
showing multitasking to be a negative performance
equalizer. (We note that a high number of multitasking
participants older than 45 fell in the naive cluster,
indicating that the secondary task might have more
greatly impacted their ability to detect phishing emails.)

5. Further discussion
Interpretations - The complexity of human
security behaviors makes sophisticated analysis regimes
necessary for revealing insightful patterns. Initially,
understanding the roles of incentives and demographics
on user performance proved challenging. Through the
combined efforts of the statistical tests and clustering
analysis described in this work, as well as the analyses
in several previously-published reports, we have
developed reasonable conclusions as to the influence of
these factors.
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Multitasking has a significant negative effect on
participants’ capability to identify phishing emails and
greatly changes patterns shown for participants only
occupied by the email sorting task. This is unsurprising,
considering the overhead caused by frequently
switching between the two tasks. Surprisingly,
monetary incentives are ineffective at improving critical
decision making during phishing recognition. These
findings would demand appropriate adjustment of
strategies for security behavior interventions.
More importantly, demographic and background
traits, including education level, experience of
cybersecurity training, age, and knowledge of phishing
cues, represent useful and reliable predictors for a
participant's security behaviors. Such findings echo
other studies including that by Sheng et al. [5]. These
results offer further support for the role of education and
security training in improving critical skills in security
tasks. They are especially informative for developing
individualized and customized anti-phishing strategies.
Limitations - The first challenge comes from the
constraints of an unattended empirical study that relied
on maintaining participants’ attention. We had to
consider factors including the session time, Internet
connection, types of web browser, etc., in experiment
design and execution. We could only accommodate 40
emails that likely do not accurately reflect the real-world
ratio of legitimate to phishing emails (although the
50/50 split is consistent with previous phishing
research). The phishing cues may not be fully
representative of all possible cases. Moreover, arguably
a larger number of participants per condition could have
enabled more conclusive findings.
The second challenge lies in information
availability and quality. Certain information modalities
are not available from unattended experiments. For
example, we were not able to capture eye gaze
movement so could not conclusively determine whether
participants focused on a certain element in an email.
While we disabled all unused functions on the
Roundcube interface, the nature of such a remotelyconducted, Internet-based user study means that noise
might still be introduced if participants did not follow
instructions closely. However, such variation is an
inherent risk for any user study conducted in similar
real-world settings.

6. Conclusion
This work is unique in characterizing empirical data
of phishing decision-making, gathered on real users in a
real-world scenario, and through the range of clustering
and other analyses. The presented findings touched only
a part of the rich information available in the complete

dataset of our phishing study, publicly available at
http://behavior.isi.jhu.edu/. Ongoing and future efforts
aim to examine additional information in these data.
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